This paper studies a new representation of individ~l preferences termed the benefit function. The benetit function b(g; x,u) measures the amount that an individual is willing to trade, in terms of a specific reference commodity bundle g, for the opportunity to move from utility level a to a consumption bundle x. The benefit function is therefore a generalization of the willingness-to-pay concept. This paper studies properties of this function, including its continuity and structural properties and its indirect relation to the underlying utility function. A very important property of the benefit function is that it is the natural precursor of the expenditure function, in the sense that the expenditure function is a (special) dual of the benefit function. This duality is shown to be complete by proving that when appropriate convexity properties hold, the (correspondingly special) dual of the expenditure function is, in fact, the benefit function. The duality makes the benefit function a powerful tool for analysis of welfare issues.
Introduction
The concept of individual preferences forms the foundation for the modern microeconomic theory of choice. The preference construct is rich enough to provide a general explanation for how individuals make economic decisions; and yet by purposely avoiding the assignment of absolute measures, it does not invite inter~rsonal comparisons. Indeed, it supports the common premise that such comparisons are meaningless.
Nevertheless, it is frequently convenient (and sometimes necessary) to, in fact, make interpersonal comparisons; such as when (certain types of) decisions are made that affect the welfare of a group of individuals. Such comparisons can be conducted formally by defining an overall societal preference relation (or welfare function). But a more direct technique is to represent individual preferences in a manner that facilitates combination.
The benefit function
Consider a world with d homogeneous and infinitely divisible commodities. A bundfe of these commodities is a vector XE Rd. Consider also a single consumer. This consumer has a consumption possibility set SC Rd from which bundles could be chosen if there were no economic constraints. For much of our work below, we assume that S= Rd, (that is, the set of nonnegative vectors in Rd), but more general 3's may also be considered. However, we shall always assume that .!Z is closed, convex, and has a lower bound.
The consumer also has a preference ordering on E that can be represented by a continuous utility function u. We denote the range of u over S by "11. With these preliminaries, we introduce our main definition.
Dejkition.
For any g, x, u with g # 0, g E Rd, , x E !X, u E 42 let ifx-pgEX,andu(x-j?g)zuforsomep --co otherwise.
The function b defined this way is the benefit function associated with the utility function u and the consumption possibility set L!Z.
The maximization operation in the definition is well defined because u is continuous and 3 has a lower bound. There is a simple economic interpretation of b(g; x, u). Basically, b(g; x, u) is the amount of commodity bundle g that the consumer would be willing to trade for the possibility of moving from utility level u to the bundle x.
The vector g is a reference vector defining the measure by which alternative bundles are compared. It might be taken as g=(l, 1,. . . , 1) or as a specific commodity. Typically, the bundle g does not vary in a discussion.
There are some associated definitions which characterize various possible choices of the reference vector g.
The utility function tl can usually be recovered from the benefit function by solving the implicit equation b(g; x, u) = 0 for u in terms of X; but some special conditions are required for this to work -essentially the ray through x in the direction g (both positive and negative) must cut the set where utility has value u in at most one point. Special cases are spelled out in the following proposition. [7
The benefit function enjoys certain structural properties. Proof. The first three of these follow immediately from the definition. To prove (d) suppose g is weakly good and b(g; x, u) 20. For /I = b(g; x, u) we have u(x-pg) 2 u with /I 20. Since g is weakly good, u(x) 2 u(x -/3g) 2 U. 0
We turn next to the continuity properties of the benefit function. Normally, g is fixed in any development, so we are mainly interested in continuity with respect to x and U. However, we can consider continuity with respect to g as well. For generality, we shall temporarily relax our running assumption that u is continuous. Proof. Fix g, 2, zi with g #O, and let &=b(g; 2, ti). We must show that given E>O there is a neighborhood of (g,f, U) such that for all (g,x, u) in this neighborhood b(g; x, u) < 6+ E.
Suppose the converse. Then there is a sequence {(g,, Xi, uJ} with gi +g, xi-+X, Ui~zS and bi =b(g,; xi, ui) 1 &+a for all i. We can assume that the gi's are bounded away from 0. The sequence {bi} is bounded above because the range of j?'s such that Xi -figi is feasible is bounded above (recall gz0, X=R",). Hence, there is a convergent subsequence of {bi}, which without loss of generality, we can take to be {bi) itself. Thus bi --, b0 for some be.
We have U(Xi --big,) 2 Ui. By upper semi-continuity of U, it follows that u(X -b,g) 2 lim u(xi -big,) 2 U. Proof. In view of Proposition 3, we must only show that b is lower semi-continuous. Fix X EX and UE@. Let &= b(g; X, ii) . Suppose b were not lower semi-continuous at (X, ri). Then there is E>O and a sequence {Xi, Ui} such that xi 42, U and b, = b(g; Xi, ui) <6-e for all i. We know that X-~~EX. Hence, there is an I such that xi -(6-s/3)g~% for all i > I. We also have u(xi-big) zui, and since bi is the maximum value for which this inequality holds, it follows that u(xi -(bi + &/3)g) c ui* Now let SL be the closure of a neighborhood of 2 (relative to 9) such that for all x E a, x -(6-.s/3)g is feasible. Let
We have 6>0 because g is good and u is continuous on Q.
From U(X~ -(bi +&/3)g) <ui and bi <6-c, we have U(Xi -(6-2&/3)g) <Ui. From the definition of 6, U(Xi -(b-.5/3)g) 6 U(Xi -(6-2&/3)g) -6 5 ui -6.
Taking the limit, we obtain u(Z-(6-s/3)g) 5 G-6 which contradicts the definition of 6. Thus no such ((x,,uJ) sequence can exist. Hence the function b is lower semi-continuous.
q
One of the most important properties of the benefit function is that it is concave if u is quasi-concave. quasi-concave, then b(g; x,u) is concave with respect to x and continuous with respect to x on the interior of the region where it is finite. Conversely, if b(g; x, u) is concave in x for all u E 42, and g is weakly good, then the utility function is quasi-concave.
Proposition 5. If the utility function u is
Proof. Assume u is quasi-concave. Let x,,x,E% be given. Select ue@. Suppose first that b (g; x1, u) and b(g; x2, u) are finite. Then, by definition, 4x1-0; xl,ulg)Lu, 4x2 -bk; xz, uk) 2 u.
By quasi-concavity of the utility function orx, -cib(g; x,,u)g+(l-4x2 -(I -4b(g; xz,u) Then if g is weakly good, Proposition 2(d) gives u(ax, +(l -or)xz) zu. Hence the function u is quasi-concave.
•l
We show that the benefit function inherits monotonicity that might be possessed by the underlying utility function. Finally, we give the following converse proposition which shows which properties of a function insure that it is in fact a benefit function. Aside from continuity, the properties required are the translation property and the property that b(g; x, u) be nonincreasing in u. By property (b) the maximization operation is not void. By the upper semi-continuity of b(x,u) with respect to u, and the compactness of % the maximum exists. We show that the function u defined above is upper semicontinuous. Suppose it were not. Then there is E>O and a sequence {Xi} with xi E X, xi + x such that U(xi) > ~(2) + E for all i. Let Ui =u(xJ. Since the Ui's are contained in a bounded interval, there is a limit point U. Without loss of generality, we can assume ui +u. We have b(x, ui) 20 for all i. Since b is upper semi-continuous, it follows that b(Z, 17) 20. Therefore, by definition u(X) 2 U. However, since u(xi) >u(X) + E for all i, we must have r.iz u(2) +E, which is a contradiction.
Next we show that b is the benefit function of u. Let 6 be the benefit function of u (with reference g). First assume 6(x, u) > -co. Then Let U=u(x),U=u(x+ag).
We have b(x,ii)zO and tJ=max{u:b(x,u)L -a}. Thus tJ?ii, which shows that g is weakly good. IJ
Aggregate benefits
Formally, we can define the aggregate benefit function for a group of consumers by summing their individual benefits. For example, suppose there are n consumers. Each consumer i has a consumption possibility set pi with the properties discussed in section 2 and a continuous utility function ui. Then the aggregate benefit function for this group of consumers is by definition equal to the maximum amount of the bundle g that the group would trade to move from existing utility levels U = (ui, u2,. . . u,) to the allocation X=(x1,x2,..., x,). That is, the benefit function for the group is B(g; X, U) = max f: Bi sub to ai(x1 --P,g)Zu,, i=l where B(g; X, U) = -cc is understood if the above constraints are not feasible.
It is clear that the maximization problem above separates into n problems. That is we see that B(g; x, u, = i bi(g; xi, ui).
i=l
Thus, the benefit function of the group is simply the sum of the individual benefit functions. That is, benefit functions can be meaningfully summed across consumers to obtain a measure of aggregate benefits.
Examples
In this section, we compute the benefit function for some specific functional forms.
Example 1 (Cobb-Douglas).
Consider the Cobb-Douglas utility function 4X1,X,,..., xm)= Jy xy, i=l where ai>O,i=1,2 ,..., m. For general g>O the benefit function cannot be expressed in closed-form. However, for
with the 1 in the jth position, the benefit function is found by solving (xj -p)"j n xfi = u.
i+j
The resulting /I is equal to b(x, u). Hence =u.
This gives ..., x, , , u}. Example 4 (additive) . The logarithmic form of the Cobb-Douglas utility (Example 2) is an example of this type.
Another special case of interest is This gives
Example 5 (the oriented-quadratic utility). We propose here a special kind of degenerate quadratic utility that is both mathematically convenient and economically meaningful. We refer to this form as the oriented-quadratic form. Let the reference bundle g 2 0, g #O, be given. Select d satisfying' dTg= 1 and select an n x n symmetric matrix B that is negative semi-definite (of rank n-1) with Bg=O. Then define
This utility function is oriented in the direction g. The translation property of the utility function is easily verified as u(x + ag) =dT(x+ ag) + f(x + ag)TB(x + ag) =dTx+adTg+$xTBx+agTBx++a2gTBg = dTx + a + +xTBx = u(x) + a. ' In this example we consider all vectors to be column vectors and let dT denote the transpose. This clarifies the equations that have products of vectors times matrices.
The corresponding benefit function is found from the equation dT(X -bg) + 3(x -bg)TB(x -bg) = u.
Or (using the translation property found above) dTx-b++xTBx=u.
Hence b(x, u) = dTx + +xTBx -u.
We see that the utility function and the benefit function have essentially identical expressions in the oriented-quadratic case. The reason is that the indifference curves are equally spaced.
Example 6 (general oriented utility). Suppose u(x) = dTx + F(x)
where dTg= 1, F(x+ erg) = F(x) for all a, and F is concave. Then, it is readily deduced that b(x, u) = dTx + F(x) -u.
Duality properties
We come now to what is one of the most important properties of the benefit function; namely, its dual relation with the expenditure function. We show that the benefit function is the precursor of the expenditure function, in the sense that the expenditure function is (in a certain sense) the dual of the benefit function. This leads naturally to a definition of a second dual -the dual of the expenditure function -which is termed the hyper-benefit function. A central result of this section establishes the full duality of these concepts by showing that under appropriate conditions the hyper-benefit function is, in fact, identical to the benefit function.
Definition. Given a utility function u on X, the expenditure function is e(p,u)= inf {p.x:u(x)2u},
XEI
where PER" and UE%.
Note that if the function u is continuous and if p>O, then the infimum in the definition will be achieved, and hence can be replaced by minimization. It is well known that the expenditure function enjoys a number of useful properties. Proof. See Diewert (1974) and Berge (1963) .
We now derive an alternate characterization of the expenditure function that shows its relation to the benefit function. [Throughout the following we frequently write b(x,u) for the value of the benefit function, suppressing the dependence on g.] Since E>O was arbitrary, inf {p-x-b(x,u)p.g}Se(p,u).
X~b
This alternate characterization of e(p, u) applies only if p .g>O. This would include all p 20 if g> 0. In general, prices with p *g 50 are not needed, and hence the apparent restriction is of no real consequence.
The factor p * g in the second term of the above representation can be eliminated by simply setting it to 1. This essentially restricts the p vectors under consideration to those satisfying p'g= 1. This, of course, is the standard form of normalization used in many economic arguments. We then obtain (trivially) the following corollary, which displays the relation between b and e in a neater form. 
xsl
(1)
The relation between the benefit function b and the expenditure function e can be illustrated graphically in a simple and intuitive way. For the construction in two dimensions, it is simplest to take g=( l,O), corresponding to the direction of the horizontal axis. With this choice, if a price vector p is normalized with p *g= 1 (that is, (P)~ = l), then the constant c associated with the hyperplane H= {x: p' x = c} is just the distance from the origin to the point where the hyperplane intersects the horizontal axis. Thus, given x and p, the value p * x is measured by the point where the hyperplane through x intersects the horizontal axis.
The alternative characterizations of the expenditure function are shown in fig. 1 . Usually the value of the expenditure function is found by finding the point x* in the upper contour set S = {x: u(x) 2_u} which has the least value of p. x. This point will be that where a p-hyperplane is tangent to S. The value of the expenditure function is then p. x*. If p .g = 1, this value will be equal to the distance from the origin to the point where the p-hyperplane intersects the horizontal axis.
The formula given by the corollary above does not restrict the search to x's inside of S. A point such as x r in the figure will also yield a value of p. x-b(g; x, u) equal to e(p, u) . While a point such as x2 will lead to a larger value. The new formulation introduces a bit of degeneracy, in the sense that many x's (namely all those on the horizontal line through x*) will achieve the infimum in (1).
To make the duality between b and e more explicit, we introduce the dual of e. Definition. Corresponding to the expenditure function e, we define the hyper-benefit function 6(g; x,u)=inf{p.x-e(p,u):p*g=l} (2) for any geR",,g#O,xeS and UE%.
The formula is, of course, the dual of (1). It is not surprising, therefore, that we have the following. " and x + ag E SF, then 6(g; x + ag, u) = a + 6(g; x, u) . Monotonicity: 6(g; x, II) is nondecreasing in u. Concavity: 6(g; x, u) is concave with respect to x. Continuity: ii(g; x,u) is continuous with respect to x in the interior of the region in which it is finite.
Proof. (a) p.(x+ag)-e(p,u)=p*x+ap*g-e(p,u).
Hence, if p.g= 1, p*(x+ag)-e(p,u)=a+p*x-e(p,u).
Taking the inlimum over p gives the result. 
(d) This follows from part (c). 0
We now come to the main duality result, showing that the hyper-benefit function is the dual of the dual of the benefit function itself. The hyperbenefit function, being defined by hyperplanes, essentially uses only the convexified version of the original utility function. If the original utility function is quasi-concave, then the hyper-benefit function will agree with the benefit function. (Note 1: The proof of the following main theorem could be simplified if either g was good, the utility function was strongly monotonic, or g> 0. It is, perhaps, surprising that in fact none of these conditions is required.) (Note 2: This theorem is similar to the standard duality theorem for conjugate duality. However, because our definition of duality is a degenerate version of conjugate duality, a separate proof is required.) To prove the reverse inequality fix x E %. Assume first that b(g; x, u) > -co. Let x0 =x -b(g; x, u)g. Then x,, is a boundary point of the upper contour set S = {x': u(x') 2 u, x' E %}. S is a closed set by continuity.
Given E >O, consider the point z E R" defined by z=xO -sg. (This point may not be feasible, but that does not matter.) Clearly z$S. Let X be the point in S that is closest to z as measured by the Euclidean norm, and let h be the vector X-z. (See fig. 2 .) The hyperplane defined by {x': h. x' = h. X} is a supporting hyperplane of S at X, since it is orthogonal to h. We have hez<h..?, h.x,,~h*Z. Hence, h.(x,,-z)>O. But using x,,-z=sg, this gives h*g>O. We now let P=h/(h.g), so that p'g= 1. Thus p is a feasible vector for the intimum operation defining b(g; x, u). Now for the p above, e(p, u) = p. X. Hence, where in the second line we used x0=x -b(g; x, u)g. We need to bound the term p. (x0 -3) . Since h .x,,zIr.% and h.z<h.%, there is a (unique) point x1 on the segment joining these two which is in the supporting hyperplane. (See fig. 2 .) We then write
The second term on the right is zero since both x1 and X are in the J.Math hyperplane. The first term is less than or equal to E since x0-x1 is a shortened version of x0 -z = sg. Using this above, we have 6(g; x, u) 5 b(g; x, u) + E.
Since E > 0 was arbitrary we have 6(g; x, u) 5 b(g; x, u). Combining this with the reverse inequality found earlier gives equality.
We must now treat the case b(g; x, u) = -co. This means that the ray Q={x':x'=x+ag, a real} does not intersect the upper contour set S= {x': u(x')zu}. Suppose first that this ray is bounded away from S. Then the set S-Q is convex and bounded away from zero. Let h be the vector in the closure of S -Q closest to 0. Then there is 6 > 0 such that h * s-h. q 2 6 for all s E S, q E Q. In particular for any X E S there holds h * X-h. (x + ag) > 6 for all a. This implies h .g=O. In other words, h defines a hyperplane containing the ray, which can be shifted outward by an amount 6 before it touches S. Now let po>O be a vector with p. .g= 1. Then define p=po + kh. (See fig. 3 .) Clearly p.g= 1. We have e(p, 14) = inf {p . x': x' E S } =inf{p,.x'+kh.x':x'ES} Therefore &g; x, u) Since k was arbitrary 6(g; x, U) = -co and the proof is complete. Cl
Relation to the distance function
Another function, the distance function, [see Shephard (1953) ] is of common use in microeconomic theory and it also has a dual relation to the expenditure function. It is worthwhile to briefly compare it with the benefit function. The distance function d is defined as d(x, u) = max (6: u(x/S) 2 u}.
Geometrically d (x,u) is the maximum factor by which x can be reduced in order to reach the indifference curve determined by u.
For pz 0, the expenditure function can be written in terms of the distance function as e(p,u)=min(p*x:d(x,u)=l}. XEI And, under appropriate assumptions, the distance function can be recovered as the dual of the dual by d(x, u) = min {p . x: e(p, u) = l}.
P20
These are strong dual relations, and indicate that the distance function is also a natural precursor of the expenditure function. There are, however, important distinctions between distance-expenditure duality and the benefit-expenditure duality. Mathematically, the distinction is simply that the distance function is based on Lagrange duality, while the benefit function is based on a modified Legendre or Fenchel duality. [See Fenchel (1953) .] But, from an economic viewpoint the main distinction between the two is traced to a difference in the method of price vector normalization. The distance function is defined by normalizing the expenditure of the consumer to 1. The benefit function is defined by normalizing prices absolutely, by p. g = 1. The advantage of the second becomes apparent when one considers problems involving more than one consumer. The single normalization of the benefit function theory can be applied to all consumers, while the distance function approach requires that a given price vector be normalized differently for each consumer. The original (primal) definition of the distance function as a scale factor also has no ready welfare interpretation. Hence, although there are indeed connections between the benefit function and the distance function, these connections are somewhat convoluted. The distance function can be useful in developing relations in individual consumer theory. The benefit function has use in developing group welfare relations.
Conclusions
The benefit function is a natural generalization of the familiar concept of willingness to pay, but measured with respect to an arbitrary bundle of goods. This generalization has the advantage that, unlike a measure that uses a specific single reference commodity, the benefit function can be described in terms of the natural variables of a situation, rather than in terms of partitioned variables. This makes the benefit function a natural candidate for deeper study. This paper shows that the benefit function has desirable structural and continuity properties. Its strong economic interpretation and its duality relation with the expenditure function make it a valuable general tool for economic analysis -especially for welfare issues. 
